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MAPPING A RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATIONS FOR
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW SAILING
BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDERS
RIGIS BISMUTH*
I. INTRODUCTION
"I never had dinner with a legal person - Neither did I, although I often saw it
paying the bill." This aphorism, part of the classics heard by every law student in
France, remarkably encapsulates the genuine ambivalence of the concept and
status of "legal persons."2 This is more particularly the case with corporations,
which have become the main vehicles of human economic activities. As creatures
of domestic law, corporations do not enjoy the plenary legal personality of natural
persons, which is limited not only by the consent of their creators but also by the
scope of rights and duties available for them in the domestic legal order from
which they stem. The intense scholarly debate concerning the content of corporate
legal personality, going far beyond the legal sphere, has highlighted a critical
dividing line on the question of the existence of a moral dimension of corporations.
Indeed, they are, for some, potentially "full-fledged moral persons,"4 while others
consider that corporations "lack the emotional make-up that allows natural persons
to show virtues and vices."5 Besides, the lack of consensus on this issue - and
therefore on a possibility of the existence of a mens rea of such entities - is
reflected in the disparities among domestic laws on the criminal responsibility of
corporations which, when existing, are often restricted to specific offenses and are
triggered under specific conditions.6
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Scholar), Research and Teaching Fellow in Public International Law at Universit6 Paris 1 Panth6on-
Sorbonne, Centre d'Etudes et de Recherche en Droit International - CERDIN (since 2004). E-mail:
regis.bismuth@gmail.com. The author is grateful to Eugenia Levine for her useful comments on a
previous draft. The views expressed in this article are those of the author only and any errors or
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1. The first part of the sentence has been attributed to Ldon Duguit, one of the most reputed
French legal scholars of the early twentieth century, the retort to Professor Jean-Claude Soyer.
2. For a sampling of the seminal analyses of the concept see, e.g., Frederick W. Maitland, Moral
Personality and Legal Personality, 6(2) JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY OF COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION 192
(1905); Bryant Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE L.J. 283 (1928); see also LtON MICHOUD, LA
THORIE DE LA PERSONNALITE MORALE ET SON APPLICATION AU DROIT FRANQAIS 16 (1908); see also
ERNST ZITELMANN, BEGRIFF UND WESEN DER SOGENANNTEN JURISTISCHEN PERSONEN 12 (1873).
3. See W. Jethro Brown, The Personality of Corporation and the State, 21 L. Q. REV. 365
(1905).
4. Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16(3) AM. PHIL. Q. 207 (1979).
5. Robert E. Ewin, The Moral Status of the Corporation, 10 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 749 (1991).
6. See, e.g., JONATHAN CLOUGH & CARMEL MULHERN, THE PROSECUTION OF CORPORATIONS
(Oxford University Press 2002); JAMES GOBERT & MAURICE PUNCH, RETHINKING CORPORATE CRIME
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Beyond the issue of the criminal responsibility for the violations of domestic
laws, recent developments have demonstrated the growing outreach of the
international humanitarian law ("IHL") framework for corporations, and
consequently its possible international criminal responsibility corollaries. Indeed,
modem armed conflicts involve more and more non-state actors, notably private
military forces, 7 but also implicate, although indirectly, traditional corporations
carrying out economic activities, notably in the field of extraction and/or
commercial exploitation of natural and mineral resources. In these contexts, it is
often the case that "financial gain . . . may be either the cause of atrocities
committed in conflicts or the reasons for their continuation."9 Several acts
conducted within the framework of business activities during an armed conflict
may eventually fall under the scope of international humanitarian law and
constitute war crimes. 10 A recent study of the ICRC mentions the following:
unlawful taking of property, forced labor, displacement of populations, severe
damage to the environment, and the manufacture and trading of prohibited
weapons." Although it should be mentioned that "transnational companies are not
necessarily the worst perpetrators," 12 the trend of their involvement in contentious
activities in the context of an ongoing armed conflict raises the legitimate question
of the criminal responsibility of these legal entities, especially given that
"accountability would be increased if it were possible to prosecute directly the
companies participating in such atrocities."1 3
Envisaging the criminal responsibility of corporations for grave violations of
IHL necessarily implies a determination of whether they hold rights and duties
under the international law of armed conflict. It should be pointed out beforehand
that corporations are currently only legal creatures of domestic legal orders and
they are not subjects of the international purely interstate legal system. States,
however, may adopt norms of public international law recognizing such rights and
(Butterworths LexisNexis 2003). For a recent and exhaustive contribution to this debate see Thomas
Weigend, Societas Delinquere non Potest? A German Perspective, 6 J. OF INT'L CRIM. JUST. 927
(2008).
7. Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Business Goes to War: Private Military Security Companies and
International Humanitarian Law, 88 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 525 (2006); Cedric Ryngaert,
Litigating Abuses Committed by Private Military Companies, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1035 (2008).
8. See, e.g., Rights and Accountability in Development, Unanswered questions - Companies,
Conflict and the Democratic Republic of Congo (2004) [hereinafter RAID], available at
http://www.raid-uk.org/docs/UN Panel DRC/Unanswered Questions ES.pdf.
9. ROBERT CRYER, HAKAN FRIMAN, DARRYL ROBINSON & ELIZABETH WILMSHURST, AN
INTODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 453 (Cambridge University Press
2007).
10. See id.
11. ICRC, BUSINESS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW - AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
24 (2006) [hereinafter ICRC]; see also Erik Mose, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Rwandan
Genocide, 6 J. OF INT'L CRIM. JUST. 973 (2008) (providing the example of involvement of media
corporations in the Rwandan genocide).
12. Malin Helgesen, War Zones and Grey Zones - Does Legal Liability of Companies Exist Under
the International Law ofArmed Conflict?, 4-5 TIDSSKRIFT FOR RETTSVITENSKAP 576 (2005).
13. CRYER, FRIMAN, ROBINSON & WILMSHURST, supra note 9, at 453.
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duties to non-state actors.1 This, for instance, is the case for corporations through
the network of international investment agreements.15 While the latter category
recognizes rights to corporations, it is doubtful that IHL and international criminal
law frameworks embed international duties weighing on domestic legal persons.
On the basis of the foregoing, Part I will assess the existence of legal
obligations under international law for corporations and will inquire into the
possible channels for the recognition of their responsibility. This analysis will
demonstrate that international law provides minimal and fragmented mechanisms
of responsibility for violations of IHL by corporations. Domestic legal orders,
however, offer a more appropriate and welcoming environment. Being creatures of
and enjoying a broader legal personality under domestic law, corporations are
subject not only to the purely national regulations but also to the international
obligations inserted in domestic law, among which are those of IHL. Part II will
consider this emerging application of fundamental IHL norms to corporations, and
the litigation ensuing before domestic courts, with a special emphasis on the US
Aliens Tort Claims Act.
II. THE MINIMAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF IHL IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
Despite the growing presence of non-state actors in the majority of armed
conflict, IHL remains a "state-based order" 16 and criminal responsibility
mechanisms that have been established focus primarily on individuals, leaving no
room for the recognition of violations of IHL by corporations at the international
level (A). Beyond this structural lack of criminal accountability, alternative
channels of responsibility need to be explored as they suggest a growing concern
of the international community about the implications of corporations becoming
increasingly involved in armed conflict (B).
A. A Structural Unsuitability for Corporations to Be Held Responsible of
Violations ofIHL Before International Criminal Courts and Tribunals
As mentioned above, the first step in the analysis requires determining the
content of the international legal personality of corporations. In the Reparations
case, the ICJ pointed out that "[t]he subjects of law in any legal system are not
necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights." 7 As a state-
14. As pointed out in 1928 by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case of
Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, "it cannot be disputed that the very object of an international
agreement, according to the intention of the contracting Parties, may be the adoption by the Parties of
some definite rules creating individual rights and obligations." Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig,
Advisory Opinion, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 15, at 17, available at http://www.worldcourts.com/
pcij/eng/decisions/1928.03.03_danzig/.
15. See Patrick Dumberry, L 'Entreprise Sujet de Droit International? Retour sur la Question a la
Lumidre des Diveloppements Ricents du Droit International des Investissements, 108 REvuE
GENERALE DE DROIT INT'L PUBLIC 112-13, 116-17 (2003).
16. Helgensen, infra note 122, at 574.
17. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949
I.C.J. 174, 178 (1949).
2010 205
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
centered legal system, States enjoy a plenary international legal personality18 and
"possess a general competence." 19 The content of the legal personality of other
subjects of international law may, however, significantly vary from one to
another.20 When it comes to assessing the potential responsibility of corporations at
the international level, it is necessary to determine the duties of corporations under
the IHL framework (1) and the possible suitability of the existing international
mechanisms of accountability for corporations (2).
1. The Potential International Legal Personality of Corporations under IHL
The respect of the core IHL instruments, i.e. the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and the 1977 Additional Protocols, rests with the High Contracting Parties which
have undertaken in common Article 1 "to respect and to ensure [their] respect for
the present Convention[s] in all circumstances." 21 However, the fact that non-state
actors are mentioned in other passages of these instruments does not ipso jure
render them accountable for violations of JHL at the international level.22
This is notably the case for serious violations of these Conventions since it is
the duty of the High Contracting Parties to "enact any legislation necessary to
provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be
committed, any of the grave breaches" of the fundamental rules of IHL,23 the same
breaches constituting war crimes under the Statute of the International Criminal
18. Grigory Tunkin, International Law in the International System, 147 RECUEIL DES COURS 201-
2 (1975) ("States possess a full-size international legal personality which comprises, inter alia, the
following elements: (1) rights and duties under international law; (2) sovereignty which means supreme
power over their respective territories and population; (3) sovereign equality of all states; (4) privileges
and immunities; (5) the capacity to participate in the process of creating norms of international law; (6)
the capacity to participate in international legal relations; (7) the capacity to bring international claims;
(8) the capacity to take enforcement actions under international law; (9) the capacity to bear
international responsibility.").
19. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. Reports 66, 78 (July 8) ("The Court need hardly point out that international organizations
are subjects of international law which do not, unlike States, possess a general competence.").
20. CHARLES DOMINICE, La Personnaliti Juridique dans le Systime du Droit des Gens, in
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY - ESSAYS IN HoNouR OF
KRZYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI 147, 160 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., Kluwer Law International 1996) ("A cet
6gard, il faut dire qu'd l'6vidence l'ensemble des droits dont un sujet de droit est susceptible d'etre
titulaire varie grandement selon les sujets de droit mais nous prdfdrons y reconnalitre un probl~me de
comp6tence. Autrement dit ... la personnalit6 juridique n'est pas divisible - elle est on elle n'est pas -
mais ... en revanche le faisceau de droits, facult6s, comp6tences, est trbs variable selon les cat6gories de
sujets du droit international.").
21. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field art.1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC (I)]; Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC (II)]; Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.135 [hereinafter
GC (III)]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 1, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC (IV)].
22. See GC (I), supra note 21, art. 49; see aslo GC (II), supra note 21, art. 50; see also CG (III),
supra note 21, art. 129; see also GC (IV), supra note 21, art. 146.
23. GC (I), supra note 21, art. 49; GC (II), supra note 21, art. 50; CG (III), supra note 21, art. 129;
GC (IV), supra note 21, art. 146.
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Court ("ICC"). 24 Additional Protocol No. 1 ("AP(I)") does not mention the
incriminations at the domestic level for these violations and, when providing that
"[t]he High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall repress grave
breaches, and take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches" 25 and that
"grave breaches of these instruments shall be regarded as war crimes,"26 it offers
an international incrimination for such violations, but without mechanisms of
enforcement.
Considering that the Conventions do not define the meaning of the term
"persons," possibly indicating that it includes not only individuals but also legal
persons,27 and considering that AP(I) refers to "war crimes" without mentioning
21the nature of their authors, it appears that these instruments do not explicitly
preclude corporations bearing duties under IHL. Besides, an ICRC study points out
that "although states and organized armed groups bear the greatest responsibility
for implementing international humanitarian law, a business enterprise carrying out
activities that are closely linked to an armed conflict must also respect applicable
rules of international humanitarian law." 2 9 However, while corporations are likely
to fall within the scope of IHL, these instruments do not implement mechanisms of
enforcement for violations of these obligations.30 We must therefore determine
whether the responsibility of corporations may be held under the international
criminal law framework, separately from IHL.
2. The Nonexistent International Legal Personality of Corporations under
International Criminal Law
Although international criminal courts and tribunals have decided cases
involving activities carried out by corporations, they have persistently refused to
consider the possibility of the criminal responsibility of legal persons. Besides, this
position has been integrated in the Statute of the International Criminal Court
("ICC") which does not contemplate corporate responsibility.
Regarding the first generation of international criminal tribunals, it should be
mentioned that the Charter of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal
("IMT") had jurisdiction for "the trial and punishment of the major war
24. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S 90, 94
[hereinafter ICC Statute] ("For the purpose of this Statute, 'war crimes' means: (a) Grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons or property
protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention . . .").
25. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 86, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3, 42-43 [hereinafter Additional Protocol].
26. Id. at 42.
27. GC (I), supra note 21, art. 53 (referring to the prohibition of "[t]he use by individuals,
societies, firms or companies either public or private ... of the emblem or the designation 'Red Cross'
or 'Geneva Cross' .... ," suggesting that the term "persons" of Article 49 may include all these
categories) (emphasis added).
28. Additional Protocol, supra note 25, art. 75.
29. ICRC, supra note 11, at 14.
30. See, e.g., GC (I), supra note 21; see also GC (II), supra note 21; see also CG (III), supra note
21; see also GC (IV), supra note 21.
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criminals ... acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as
individuals or as members of organizations."31 The responsibility of legal persons
was therefore removed ab initio and, besides, the IMT declared in a much-quoted
passage that "[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can
the provisions of international law be enforced."32 However, a very distinctive
feature of the IIMT Charter was the possibility "[a]t the trial of any individual
member of any group or organization" to "declare . . . that the group or
organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal organization" 33
and, as such, four organizations were declared as criminal by the Tribunal.34 The
recognition of the criminal responsibility of these defacto or dejure organizations
should not, however, be interpreted as a recognition by the IIMT of the criminal
responsibility of legal persons. Indeed, this specific provision of the IMT Charter
was linked to the so-called "Control Council Law No. 10" established to prosecute
criminals of lower rank. To be sure, an individual's mere membership in one of
the organizations already declared as criminal by the IMT constituted a crime.36
Therefore, the criminalization of several organizations by the "Control Council
Law No. 10" served to provide a legal basis for the prosecution of individuals and
should be distinguished from genuine corporate responsibility mechanisms, the
rationale of which is not to establish a collective punishment of all persons
involved in an organization3 7 and does not necessarily imply that the entire
organization was inherently criminal in its purpose. Nonetheless, several cases -
known as the "Industrial Cases" 38 - decided under the "Control Council Law No.
10" are very instructive as they highlighted the potential relationship between
corporate activities and the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity
(e.g. manufacturing and supplying poison, spoliation of private property, forced
labor), although only individuals, executives of these companies, were ultimately
found guilty. 39
31. Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S.
280 (emphasis added) [hereinafter IMT Charter].
32. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946, 466 (Int'l
Military Tribunal 1948).
33. IMT Charter, supra note 31, art. 9.
34. The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Gestapo, the SD and the SS. See OFFICE OF
UNITED STATES CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY, NAzI CONSPIRACY AND
AGGRESSION: OPINION AND JUDGMENT 91, 97,102 (United States Printing Office 1947).
35. See Jia Bing Bing, Control Council Law No. 10, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 281-2 (Antonio Cassese ed., Oxford University Press 2009).
36. TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUREMBERG
WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 Appendix D, art. II (Government
Printing Office 1949) ("Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime ... (d) Membership in
categories of a criminal group or organization declared criminal by the International Military
Tribunal.").
37. Helgesen, supra note 12, at 584.
38. Id. at 580.
39. See William A. Schabas, Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: Catching the
Accomplices, 83 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 439, 442 (2001); Kyle Rex Jacobson, Doing Business
208 VOL. 3 8:2
MAPPING A RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATIONS
Subsequent developments in the field of international criminal law have
confirmed the lack of power to prosecute corporations in the international arena. In
this regard, the statutes of the international criminal tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda (respectively "ICTY" and "ICTR") expressly provided
that they have jurisdiction "over natural persons." 40 However, while Article 25 of
the Statute of the ICC provides identically jurisdiction "over natural persons,"
therefore "implicitly negat[ing] - at least for its own jurisdiction - the
punishability of corporations and other legal entities," 41 its drafting history shows
that some negotiating States considered the possibility of implementing a criminal
responsibility over legal persons.42 Indeed, the 1998 Draft Statute for the ICC
provided that, in addition to natural persons and to the exclusion of States, "[t]he
Court shall also have jurisdiction over legal persons, with the exception of States,
when the crimes committed were committed on behalf of such legal persons or by
their agencies or representatives."43 This proposal, made with the idea of easing
access to restitution and compensation," was not eventually adopted by state
parties and several arguments were raised against such a possibility, including,
among dominant ones, evidentiary problems as well as the rejection of corporate
criminal responsibility concept in many domestic laws, which would have
impaired the complementary mechanism of the ICC45 (although some authors have
suggested that these obstacles are far from being insurmountable).46 It should also
be stressed that the fictional dimension of legal persons, through which
responsibilities may be shielded and assets protected by the corporate veil, renders
effective criminal responsibility more complex.47
Therefore, while IHL imposes obligations on legal persons and while the case
law of the IMT has shown how their activities may facilitate or serve as a basis of
commission of serious violations of IHL, corporations have stayed outside the
with the Devil. The Challenges of Prosecuting Corporate Officials whose Business Transactions
Facilitate War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 56 AIR FORCE L. REv. 167, 178 (2005);
Helgesen, supra note 12, at 580.
40. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 art. 6
(1993); Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 art. 5 (1994); see
Micaela Frulli, Jurisdiction Ratione Personae, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY I, at 527, 530-1 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D.
Jones eds., 2002).
41. Albin Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY I, at 767, 778 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta &
John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002).
42. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15 - July 17, 1998, Draft Statute for the International
Criminal Court, art. 76, n.9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (April 14, 1998).
43. Id. art. 23(5).
44. Eser, supra note 41, at 779.
45. Frulli, supra note 40, at 532-33; Eser, supra note 41, at 779; WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 101 (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press
2004).
46. For a comprehensive analysis see Joana Kyriakakis, Corporations and the International
Criminal Court: The Complementary Objection Stripped Bare, 19 CRIM. L.F. 115, 120-21 (2008).
47. Helgesen, supra note 12, at 585.
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scope of ratione personae jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals.
Corporate criminal conduct may therefore be judged in the international arena only
throughout the residual criminal responsibility of the natural persons48 deciding,
directing or implementing these activities, and leaving unsolved the matter of
compensation of victims and the maintaining of an activity that structurally fuels
the conflict and the commission of crimes.49 However, concluding the complete
inexistence of responsibility of corporations for violations of IHL at the
international level seems an excessive position as recent developments have shown
the development of alternative channels of responsibility.
B. Fragmented and Alternative Channels of non-Criminal International
Responsibility of Corporations for Breaches oflHL
The lack of international criminal accountability of corporations for violations
of IHL does not entirely overshadow the growing concern of the international
community about contentious corporate activities in the armed conflict context.
Thus, several international law mechanisms have in fact addressed the need of
corporate accountability. This is particularly reflected in the sanctions of the UN
Security Council (1) and other mechanisms of soft international responsibility (2).
1. UN Security Council Sanctions for Violations of IHL
As the guardian of the collective security system, the Security Council may,
under Article 41 of the UN Charter, adopt non-military coercive measures,
including "the complete or partial interruption of economic relations" (known as
"economic sanctions").o Thus, the Security Council has the power to interfere
with the course of business activities in case of threats to peace, and impose
sanctions - without any ratione personae limitations - on States, individuals,
groups of individuals or legal persons."
Following an evolution of armed conflicts implicating more non-state actors,
the practice of the Security Council since the nineties has highlighted a growing
focus of its sanctions on non-state individuals and entities, also known as
"targeted" or "smart sanctions."5 2 This new policy has resulted in measures such as
48. Outside the realm of international criminal tribunals, and under stringent conditions, they
could also fall under the scope of state responsibility, notably concerning the growing phenomenon of
outsourcing of military operations to private entities. See, e.g., Carsten Hoppe, Passing the Buck: State
Responsibility for Private Military Companies, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 989, 1014 (2008).
49. Helgesen, supra note 12, at 585 (concerning a declaration of the Prosecutor of the ICC
pointing out that "[t]here is general concern that the atrocities allegedly committed in the country may
be fuelled by the exploitation of natural resources there and the arms trade, which are enabled through
the international banking system" and that "investigation of the financial aspects of the alleged
atrocities will be crucial to prevent future crimes."); see also Press Release, Int'l Crim. Ct., (Prosecutor)
Communications Received by the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, No.: pids.009.2003-EN (July 16,
2003).
50. U.N. Charter art. 41.
51. See, e.g., Christopher C. Joyner, United Nations Sanctions After Iraq: Looking Back to See
Ahead, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 329,330-32 (2003).
52. For an overview see SMART SANCTIONS: TARGETING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT (David
Cortright & George A. Lopez eds., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2002).
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embargoes on arms and petroleum against an Angolan military group in 1993 5 and
on diamonds exports in the Sierra Leone Conflict in 2000.54 In this latter situation,
the Security Council specifically expressed its concern "at the role played by the
illicit trade in diamonds in fuelling the conflict in Sierra Leone."55 Other examples
may be found with the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions against the
Taliban regime and Al-Qaida,56 the Democratic Republic of Congo,7 C~te
d'Ivoire58 or Sudan,59 as well as establishing committees for the monitoring of their
implementation.
Two distinct kinds of corporations may be taken into account in these
decisions: those already involved in a given armed conflict and directly targeted by
the sanctions, and all the others that are preventively prohibited from carrying out
certain activities linked to this conflict.
Certainly, UN sanctions are practically limited, and cannot be compared in
terms of efficacy with the actual laws holding corporations accountable for
breaches of IHL. Given that it is the role of the UN member States to ensure the
compliance with these resolutions, the UN Security Council has no authority to
directly prosecute individuals, groups and legal persons violating its embargoes. 60
Nevertheless, the practice of the UN Security Council in imposing targeted
sanctions preventing or restricting economic activities, and thus impacting
corporate behavior in armed conflict, highlights the existence of selective
mechanisms for imposing indirect responsibility on corporations for violations of
IHL.
2. Soft Responsibility Mechanisms
Some international organizations, notably the UN and the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), have taken several initiatives
aimed at improving the corporate compliance with rules of fundamental IHL.6 1
These initiatives focus mainly on multinational corporations and target, in the
context of IHL, corporate conduct in developing countries.62 Although the
standards promulgated by the UN and the OECD are notper se binding and are not
53. S.C. Res. 864, 1 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/864 (Sept. 15, 1993).
54. S.C. Res. 1306, 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306 (July 5, 2000).
55. Id. at Preamble, T 6.
56. S.C. Res. 1267, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
57. S.C. Res. 1493, 120, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1493 (July 28, 2003).
58. S.C. Res. 1572, 17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1572 (Nov. 15, 2004).
59. S.C. Res. 1591, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1591 (Mar. 29, 2005).
60. 2 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL
ACCOUNTABILITY: CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 50 (2008).
61. For an overview see John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving Agenda,
101 AM. J. INT'LL. 819, 819-20 (2007).
62. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res.
3201, 7, U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (May 1, 1974); OECD, Annual
OECD Roundtable on Corporate Responsibility, The OECD Guidelines and Developing Countries:
Building Trust, Summary (June 14, 2005), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/23/35394320.pdf.
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accompanied with judicial accountability mechanisms,63 they tend to develop a
body of soft norms playing a great role in practice.
Among the leading soft law standards for corporations are those promulgated
by the OECD. Since 1976, the OECD has developed "Guidelines" for
multinational enterprises (the latest version released in 2000),64 which constitute a
comprehensive instrument viewed as "the central international normative
framework for corporate behaviour." 65 As such, these guidelines have a broader
scope than IHL as they deal with issues such as disclosure, taxation and
competition. However, they are governed by the general principle that enterprises
should "[r]espect the human rights of those affected by their activities consistent
with the host government's international obligations and commitments" 66 and
include rules on employment, environment and bribery, all of them being vehicles
for the integration of IHL rules.67 An illustration of the outreach of these
Guidelines in an IHL context may be found with the report of the UN Panel of
Experts on the "Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo" that used the OECD standards
as a "yardstick." 68 The panel listed the corporations considered to be in violation of
the OECD Guidelines and recommended, inter alia, that "Governments and the
UN should co-operate fully with investigations which are being launched by the
ICC into, inter alia, the complicity of business in war crimes in the DRC" 69 (for
the purpose of holding individuals accountable under international criminal law),
highlighting the potential connections between the Guidelines and the
implementation of IHL in the context of economic activities. More recently, in
2006, the OECD developed a "Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises
in Weak Governance Zones," supplementing the Guidelines of 2000, in order to
provide a stronger guidance for corporations in situations of government failures.
The innovative aspect of this instrument lies in its explicit reference to IHL, and
notably in the scope of application of this instrument as it indicates that "weak
governance zones can be identified by ... serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law and endemic violent conflict . . . involving
potentially diverse combatants."7 Special attention should therefore be paid to this
new instrument in the coming years.
63. Bernali Choudhury, Beyond the Alien Tort Claims Act: Alternative Approaches to Attributing
Liability to Corporations for Extraterritorial Abuses, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 43,63-66 (2005).
64. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporation: Revision 2000, art. 2(2), June 27, 2000, 40
I.L.M. 237, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3343,en 2649 34889 2397532 1_11_1,
00.html [hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
65. Helgesen, supra note 12, at 591.
66. OECD Guidelines, supra note 64, art. 11(2).
67. Id. arts. IV-VI.
68. RAID, supra note 8, at 1.
69. Id. at 7. On this report and the OECD Guidelines, see Daniel Leader, Business and Human
Rights - Time to Hold Companies to Account, 8 INT'L CRIM. L. R. 447, 451 (2008).
70. OECD, Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones (June
9, 2006), available at http:// www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/21/36885821.pdf
71. Id. at 42.
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The issue of corporate responsibility has also been put on the agenda of the
UN.72 Among the latest initiatives aimed at better framing corporate activities
having human rights and IHL negative impacts, the "Norms on the Responsibilities
of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights" adopted in 2003 by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights has reaffirmed and clarified the duty of
corporations to respect IHL norms, notably concerning the security of persons and
the rights of workers.73 Although this instrument was not adopted by the
Commission on Human Rights, the Commission requested the Secretary General
to appoint a special representative on this issue with the mandate, inter alia, "[t]o
identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility and accountability for
transnational corporations ... with regard to human rights" and "[t]o research and
clarify the implications for transnational corporations . . . of concepts such as
'complicity' and 'sphere of influence'." As part of this mission, the recent reports
published by the special representative John Ruggie have drawn up an inventory of
the most relevant soft law instruments with their compliance and accountability
mechanisms, including the OECD Guidelines,75 highlighting how soft law has
strengthened standards of corporate behavior in terms of compliance with IHL.
Interestingly, the Ruggie reports have devoted substantial attention to
domestic judicial mechanisms for corporate responsibility, one of the reports
pointing out "the extension of responsibility for international crimes to
corporations under domestic law" 76  through the incorporation of the
aforementioned international frameworks. This highlights the necessity to have
recourse to domestic legal orders for an effective implementation of IHL rules.
III. THE EMERGING RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF IHL IN
DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDERS
Previous developments have demonstrated that although there are emergent
mechanisms aimed at improving standards of corporate behavior on an
international level, the legal responsibility of corporations in the international legal
72. For a broad and recent analysis see Karin Buhmann, Regulating Corporate Social and Human
Rights Responsibilities at the UN Plane: Institutionalising New Forms of Law and Law-making
Approaches?, 78 NoRDic J. OF INT'L L. 1 (2009).
73. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human
Rights, Fifty-fifth Session, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (August 26, 2003). For an overview see David Weissbrodt & Muria
Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901, 912 (2003).
74. ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Human
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.87
(April 15, 2005).
75. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International
Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, 45 - 62, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35
(February 19, 2007); see also U.N. Human Rights Council, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework
for Business and Human Rights, 92, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (April 7, 2008) (prepared by John
Ruggie).
76. U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35, supra note 75, T 22.
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order remains limited. Corporations bear duties under IHL but the ratione
personae limitations of international criminal courts and tribunals as well as the
lack of coercive powers of the Security Council to compel the implementation of
its sanctions prevent their automatic enforcement. To some extent, these duties and
sanctions are almost purely declaratory at the international level. As such, their
enforcement lies in domestic legal orders. In fact, UN Member States have the
obligation to implement Security Council resolutions adopting sanctions (A) as
well as their specific IHL obligations, stemming from the various IHL
Conventions, the Statute of the ICC or customary international law (B). As it
requires a prior decision of the Security Council, the former may be described as
an "indirect" channel of responsibility, whereas the latter results from "direct"
prosecution or suits by victims against corporations at the domestic level.
A. Indirect Responsibility of Corporations Through the Domestic Implementation
of Security Council Sanctions
Although indirect, the responsibility of corporations stemming from sanctions
adopted by the Security Council is, in practice, the most effective tool to enforce
IHL norms (2) given the almost "untouchable" legal authority of these resolutions
that States have the obligation to implement (1).
1. The Duty of UN Member States to Implement Security Council Sanctions
Under Articles 25 and 48 of the UN Charter, UN member States have the duty
to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council.77 While they have the
obligation to implement such decisions, "[r]esolutions of the Security Council
leave to States the choice of means of implementation"'7 and there are almost as
many forms and vehicles of implementation as there are States. 79 Given this
diversity, only a few general remarks on the issue of implementation of these
sanctions merit some attention.
Not implementing a resolution adopting sanctions under Article 41 would
trigger the international responsibility of the recalcitrant State.o However, this
77. Article 25 provides that "[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out
the decisions of the Security Council" and Article 48 that "(1) [t]he action required to carry out the
decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken
by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
(2) Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their
action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are member". U.N. Charter arts. 25, 48.
78. Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Implementing Sanctions Resolutions in Domestic Law, in NATIONAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 33, 37 (Vera Gowlland-
Debbas ed., 2004). For an illustration of this latitude see U.N. Doc. S/RES/1572 (Nov. 15, 2004), supra
note 58 (concerning the C~te d'Ivoire where the Security Council decided that "all States shall ... take
the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply . . . of arms or any related materiel, in
particular military aircraft and equipment ... (emphasis added)).
79. For a comparative study covering Argentina, Belgium, the European Union, Finland, France,
Germany, Japan, Jordan, the Netherlands, Poland, The Czech Republic, South Africa, Namibia,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States see NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF
UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2004).
80. See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice in the
New Millennium: Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 925, 938-39 (2000).
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obligation under the Charter does not necessarily mean that such resolutions are
self-executing in domestic law. As an instrument derived from a treaty these
sanctions have, most of the time, no direct effect and require a specific measure of
implementation, highlighting "the importance of collaboration between what has
been perceived as two autonomous legal orders."8 1 However, this operation of
transposition subjects the international sanction to domestic law which may gives
rise to a conflict between the two and, as pointed out by one author, "conflicts
between domestic and international law will be dealt with in accordance with the
law of the forum; domestic courts bound by their own rules may not always uphold
the primacy of international law and the consequences will depend on the place
attributed to international law in the national system." 82
In this context, issues have arisen from the judicial review of Security Council
resolutions by national courts and the extent to which the latter could second-guess
their validity,83 particularly in the context of resolutions mandating targeted
sanctions. Individuals and legal persons have indeed challenged national measures
of implementation on the ground that they were adopted in violation of their
fundamental rights. The recent judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in
2008 in the Kadi & Al Barakaat case highlights what may constitute an indirect
judicial review of UN economic sanctions.84
This case arose from the Security Council sanctions against the Taliban
regime pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000), and the establishment
of the so-called "the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee" having the
mission to designate individuals and entities targeted by these sanctions. Mr. Kadi
and the Al Barakaat Intermational Foundation, the latter being a Swedish legal
person, contested before the ECJ the validity of the Regulation of the European
Council implementing these sanctions8 ' and notably their inclusion on the list
updated by the Sanctions Committee on the grounds, inter alia, that their right to
be heard and to an effective judicial review have not been respected.86 Beyond
discussions of the legal value of such resolutions in the European legal order, 7 the
ECJ challenged the presumed immunity from jurisdiction of European measures
implementing binding Security Council resolutions when such an implementation
would do violence to the fundamental human rights safeguarded by the European
legal order, and it pointed out that "in the light of the actual circumstances
surrounding the inclusion of the appellants' names in the list of persons and
81. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 78, at 34.
82. Id. at 35.
83. Matthias Herdegen, Review of the Security Council by National Courts: A Constitutional
Perspective, in REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY MEMBER STATES 77 (Erika de Wet & Andre
Nollkaemper eds., 2003).
84. Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat v. Council & Conn'n, 2008
E.C.R. 1-06351.
85. Council Regulation 881/2002, art. 2, 2002 O.J. (L139) 10 (EC).
86. Kadi, 2008 E.C.R. 1-06351, para. 40, 49.
87. Stefan Griller, International Law, Human Rights and the European Community's Autonomous
Legal Order: Notes on the European Court of Justice Decision in Kadi, 4 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 528
(2008).
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entities covered by the restrictive measures . . . it must be held that the rights of the
defence, in particular the right to be heard, and the right to effective judicial review
of those rights, were patently not respected."
Thus, although it appears almost impossible to challenge the internal legality
of a Security Council resolution (whether, for instance, there was a situation
justifying the adoption of economic coercive measures under Article 41 of the UN
Charter), when it comes to sanctions targeting individuals or legal persons, there
exists a possibility to review the external legality of the resolution, that is to say, its
implementation in the domestic legal order. Transposing these conclusions to
resolutions having an impact on corporations, it seems therefore that the legal
authority of general embargo measures is unchallengeable and corporations have to
comply with these economic sanctions indirectly implementing IHL norms.
2. The Implementation of Security Council Sanctions Towards Corporations
The effectiveness of UN Security Council sanctions adopted in relation to
violations of IHL compared with the prosecution before international or domestic
tribunals lies in the absence of any ratione personae limitations, therefore
facilitating the inclusion of activities conducted by corporations. One illustration
may be found in the resolution 1493 (2003) concerning the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of Congo where the Security Council decided "that all
States . . . shall . . . take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect
supply, sale or transfer, from their territories or by their nationals, or using their
flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and any related material . . . to all foreign and
Congolese armed groups and militias .. " In a nutshell, "it is States that must
enact domestic legislation to guarantee that those within their jurisdiction are not
violating embargoes." 90
At the same time, there are few examples of domestic prosecutions for
violations of these Security Council embargoes. The International Commission of
Jurists has recently reported two cases, in Italy and the Netherlands, involving
legal actions against individuals, for illicit arms sales to Sierra Leone and Liberia. 91
Although none of them resulted in convictions, this NGO pointed out that "they
may signal a new willingness on the part of national authorities to initiate
prosecutions against business people who are involved in sanctions violations
which give rise to crimes under international law."92 Beyond the rare cases of
prosecutions, it must be stressed that UN embargoes do not only potentially target
those blatantly violating these sanctions but may affect corporations in the regular
course of their activities. The case of the Turkish corporation Bosphorus is
particularly illustrative of this dimension.
In 1992 Bosphorus Airways, a Turkish charter airline company, entered into
an agreement with the Yugoslav national airline JAT, pursuant to which it leased
88. Kadi, 2008 E.C.R. 1-06351, para. 334.
89. S.C. Res. 1493, 120, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1493 (July 28, 2003).
90. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note 60, at 50.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 50-1.
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one of its airplanes for a period of four years, the Turkish company having control
of the aircraft while JAT retained ownership.93 Following the implementation of
UN sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the European level, 94
the Irish authorities impounded the aircraft while on maintenance at the Dublin
airport,95 although the lease agreement was not adopted to circumvent the UN
sanctions and the rent due was paid into block accounts.96 Bosphorus instituted
proceedings in Irish courts to challenge the seizure of the aircraft, and the dispute
was ultimately brought before the ECJ.97 The European Court, despite recognizing
that Bosphorus was a completely innocent party acting in good faith, considered,
on the infringements of "Bosphorus' fundamental rights ... to peaceful enjoyment
of its property and its freedom to pursue a commercial activity,"98 that:
"[a]s compared with an objective of general interest so fundamental for
the international community, which consists in putting an end ... to the
massive violations of human rights and humanitarian international law
in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the impounding of the aircraft
in question . . . cannot be regarded as inappropriate or
disproportionate." 99
This case eventually ended before the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR), Bosphorus alleging a violation of its fundamental right to property.100
Recalling "that the general interest pursued by the impugned measure was
compliance with legal obligations flowing from the Irish State's membership of the
European Community,"1or the ECtHR decided that "the impoundment of this
aircraft did not give rise to a violation of this right."1 0 2 The Bosphorus case is
illustrative of how the enforcement of UN economic sanctions may affect
corporations that would have not necessarily been considered accomplices of
violations of IHL in other contexts.
In addition, the impact of UN sanctions may even exist regardless of their
domestic implementation. Indeed, one author has underlined "that provisions of a
Security Council resolution may affect the legal situation of individuals in their
93. Case C-84/95, Bosphorus Airways v. Minister for Transp., Energy and Commc'ns, Ir., para. 2,
1996 E.C.R. 1-3953.
94. Council Regulation 990/93, 1993 O.J. (L 102) (EEC) (implementing UN Security Council
Resolution 820 (1993)).
95. On the basis of Article 8 of the Council Regulation 990/93 which provides "[a]ll vessels,
freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person
or undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall
be impounded by the competent authorities of the Member States." Council Regulation 990/93, art. 8,
1993 O.J. (L 102) (EEC); Bosphorus Airways, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3953, para. 4.
96. Bosphorus Airways, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3953, para. 3.
97. Id. para. 6.
98. Id. para. 19.
99. Id. para. 26.
100. Bosphorus Airways v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98, (2005), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/
view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=45036/98&sessionid=33090221&skin=hudoc
-en.
101. Id. para. 150.
102. Id. para 167.
2010 217
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
direct consequences on contractual obligations, even in the absence of domestic
implementing legislation"1 0 3 and therefore rendering possible termination of
contracts "on the basis of force majeure."104 Identically, such sanctions are applied
by arbitrators, who are not subject to a domestic legal system, as an international
public order.10 5 These situations highlight, therefore, the existence of a little self-
executing dimension of UN sanctions in contractual and/or arbitral disputes.
Thus, once IHL violations have passed through the filter of the UN Security
Council, the sanctions adopted by the Security Council have a broad effect and
may significantly impact corporations in the course of their economic activities,
even those not closely connected to the IHL violations to which these sanctions
relate. However, this mechanism of indirect corporate responsibility remains
somewhat selective and limited as it requires a prior Security Council resolution
and, most importantly, does not take into account the compensation of victims.
This lack of restorative justice of UN sanctions may be corrected through more
traditional - and direct - mechanisms of liability that have been gradually applied
to corporations.
B. An Emerging Direct Liability of Corporations Through the Application of their
International Obligations in Domestic Legal Orders
The integration of international obligations in domestic legal orders has
created two channels of liability of corporations for violations of IHL norms:
criminal and civil. However, establishing a strict distinction between the two
remains a questionable stance. Indeed, in both cases, the liability stems from
similar international obligations and, moreover, similar standards of corporate
complicity are used, regardless of the civil or criminal form of liability. 106 But
while the distinction between civil and criminal liability of corporations tends to be
blurred from a substantive perspective,1 07 it gives a clearer picture of two
procedurally different channels of liability, the criminal (1) and the civil (2)
mechanisms presenting distinct jurisdictional challenges.
1. Domestic Criminal Liability of Corporations
According to the widely accepted nulla poena sine lege principle, the
prosecution and conviction of corporations for violations of IHL are subject to the
existence of such offences in domestic legal systems as well as their applicability
to legal persons. 10
103. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 78, at 40.
104. Id
105. Genevive Bastid-Burdeau, Les Embargos Multilatiraux et Unilatiraux et leur Incidence sur
l'Arbitrage Commercial International, REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 753, 775 (2003).
106. See Lillian Manzella, The International Law Standard for Corporate Aiding and Abetting
Liability, 2006 EARTHRIGHTS INT'L 14 (observing that "U.S. civil aiding and abetting standards are
remarkably similar to the customary international law standard"); see also G.A. Res. 8/16, 45-53,
H.R.C., 8th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/16 (May 15, 2008) (discussing domestic criminal liability and
domestic civil liability in relation to international standards).
107. Weigend, supra note 6, at 944.
108. The principle of nulla poena sine lege holds that there can be "no punishment without a law
authorizing it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed., 2004).
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The existence of domestic offenses for violation of IHL should stem primarily
from the State obligations enshrined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Indeed, the
four conventions impose on High Contracting Parties the obligation "to enact any
legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing,
or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches," 109 but also "to search for
persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave
breaches, and ... bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
courts,"110 not to mention that they may "hand such persons over for trial to
another High Contracting Party"1 under the principle aut dedere aut judicare.
Despite these provisions offering States a broad jurisdictional basis to prosecute
violations of IHL,112 "the system is jeopardised by the fact that most States do not
have suitable legislation."1 13 These conventions include a substantive basis for
prosecution of such crimes, but the absence of procedural norms as well as
mechanisms of coordination between High Contracting Parties have jeopardized
their effective and homogeneous implementation, if any. 114
The implementation of the ICC Statute in the domestic legal systems of state
parties has significantly reduced these national disparities and developed the
inclusion of such crimes in national legislations. Although the ICC is subject to the
"complementarity" principle1 5 according to which the ICC shall determine that a
case is inadmissible where it "is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which
has jurisdiction over it" 116 or it "has been investigated by a State which has
jurisdiction over it,""1 it must be noted beforehand that the ICC Statute does not
expressly compel state parties to implement the criminal prohibitions within its
jurisdiction (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes - among which
genuine IHL obligations) in their domestic laws. However, its ratification by state
109. GC (I), supra note 21, art. 46; GC (II), supra note 21, art. 50; GC (III), supra note 21, art. 129;
GC (IV), supra note 21, art. 146.
110. GC (I), supra note 21, art. 46; GC (II), supra note 21, art. 50; GC (III), supra note 21, art. 129;
GC (IV), supra note 21, art. 146.
111. GC (I), supra note 21, art. 46; GC (II), supra note 21, art. 50; GC (III), supra note 21, art. 129;
GC (IV), supra note 21, art. 146.
112. Damien Vandermeersch, La Compdtence Universelle, in JURIDICTIONS NATIONALES ET
CRIMES INTERNATIONAUX 589, 891 (Antonio Cassese & Mireille Delmas-Marty eds., 2002).
113. Paolo Benvenuti, Complementarity of the International Criminal Court to National Criminal
Jurisdictions, in ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT I, at 21, 29
(Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds., 1999).
114. See, e.g., David Turns, Prosecuting Violations of International Humanitarian Law: The Legal
Position in the United Kingdom, 4 J. ARMED CONFLICT L. 1, 6 (1999).
115. John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts Versus the ICC, in THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY I, at 667 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta &
John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002).
116. ICC Statute, supra note 24, art. 17(1)(a) ("The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a
State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution.").
117. Id. art. 17(1)(b) ("The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and
the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute.").
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parties (110 so far) has led to a process of incorporation of these crimes in
domestic laws.1 18
The existence of such legal bases is not enough alone in order to prosecute
corporations as none of the existing IHL instruments "were drafted with legal
persons in mind"119 and, moreover, as mentioned above, the ICC Statute excludes
legal persons from its ratione personae jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the growing
recognition of the general criminal liability of legal persons and notably
corporations in national legal orders, 120 added to the domestic transposition of
international crimes, have been the vehicle for liability of corporations for
violations of IHL. As pointed out by a recent report on this issue, "[s]ince most of
the countries that have incorporated [international criminal law] into their domestic
statutes also do not make a distinction between natural and legal persons .. ., these
jurisdictions include corporations and other legal persons in their web of
liability."1 21
A final aspect of domestic criminal liability of corporations compared with
the vacuum left by the ICC deserves attention. The jurisdiction of the ICC is
indeed limited ratione personae not only to individuals, but also by provisions
stipulating that persons amenable to ICC jurisdiction must either be nationals of a
State party to the Rome Statute, 12 2 or must have perpetrated their criminal conduct
on the territory of a State party.123 In the absence of one the two conditions,
individual conduct must be related to a situation "referred to the Prosecutor by the
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations." 24
It is significant that domestic criminal legislation does not include such limitations
and makes possible, on certain conditions, the prosecution of a natural or legal
person of any nationality and even for a conduct occurring abroad. 125 Therefore, it
could be argued that the potential extension of domestic criminal laws to
118. Anita Ramasastry & Robert C. Thompson, Commerce, Crime and Conflict: Legal Remedies
for Private Sector Liability for Grave Breaches of International Law, FAFO, No. 536, 15 (2006),
available at http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/536/536.pdf; see Joanna Kyriakakis, Australian Prosecution
of Corporations for International Crimes, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 809, 814 (2007) (discussing the
Australian case); see W. Cory Wanless, Corporate Liability for International Crimes Under Canada's
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 201, 206 (2009) (discussing the
Canadian case).
119. Olivier De Schutter, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction as a Tool for Improving the Human Rights
Accountability of Transnational Corporations, 17 (December 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Olivier-de-Schutter-report-for-SRSG-re-extrat
rritorial-jurisdiction-Dec-2006.pdf.
120. See Weigend, supra note 6, at 928; see also FAFO surveys covering Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa,
Spain, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States, available at http://www.fafo.no
/liabilities/index.htm.
121. Ramasastry & Thompson, supra note 118, at 16.
122. ICC Statute, supra note 24, art. 12(2)(b). "[O]r, if the crime was committed on board a vessel
or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft." Id. art. 12(2)(a).
123. Id. art. 12(2)(a).
124. Id art. 13.
125. Ramasastry & Thompson, supra note 118, at 16-7.
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corporations, coupled with the extended jurisdictional basis of domestic laws, "fill
the impunity gap left by the ICC's focused jurisdictional approach [and] we should
expect national courts to cast a wider prosecutorial net than the ICC."l26
Therefore, the potential inclusion of corporate misbehaviors into domestic
criminal law frameworks seems significant. It has, however, not been implemented
in practice so far. Actually, the major cases involving corporate violations of IHL
have arisen primarily within the civil liability framework, and notably in the
United States under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
2. Domestic Civil Liability of Corporations
On paper, domestic civil liability mechanisms seem to be a more welcoming
environment than domestic criminal law frameworks for the prosecution of
corporations. In a nutshell, as pointed out by a recent report of the International
Commission of Jurists on corporate complicity in international crimes, "[i]n every
jurisdiction, despite differences in terminology and approach, an actor can be held
liable under the law of civil remedies if through negligent or intentional conduct it
causes harm to someone else."1 27 Civil liability therefore gives more latitude than
criminal liability in three main fields: (1) it applies indiscriminately to natural and
legal persons whereas criminal law often restricts the liability of legal persons; (2)
the characterization of a negligent or intentional conduct is not subject to the
principle of legality; (3) it operates on a lower standard of proof than does criminal
liability and; (4) it offers an independent source of financial redress for victims. 128
However, important drawbacks of choosing the civil liability avenue must be
highlighted: (1) ratione temporis, it is generally restricted in time and does not
benefit from the absence of statutes of limitations (imprescriptibilite) attaching to
violations of IHL in domestic law1 29 (which is of great importance considering the
frequent long time lapse between the perpetration of the crimes and the moment
when victims get organized to seek a remedy); (2) it is limited by more stringent
jurisdictional considerations and, inter alia, is not governed by universal
jurisdiction mechanisms 30 (therefore it seems impossible to sue on civil grounds in
State X for a violation of IHL perpetrated abroad on a foreign victim by a foreign
corporation, which could be possible in a criminal prosecution under certain
conditions); (3) the negligent or intentional conduct is not necessarily assessed by
the yardstick of international humanitarian and criminal law, and the standard of
causality between the conduct and the harm may differ from the one of complicity
in a criminal context1 3 1 and; (4) a civil liability claim, implicating persons with
different nationalities, or dealing with harm that occurred abroad, involves the
application of conflict of laws principles and, although the majority of countries
126. Wanless, supra note 118, at 205-06.
127. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY VOL. 3, 10
(2008).
128. Id. at 4-6.
129. Id. at 44-5.
130. Id. at 49-51.
131. Id. at 13, 21.
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apply the lex loci delecti principle (application of the law of the country where the
harm occurred), domestic courts may implement different standards (the law of the
country having the most significant relationship with the parties, the law of the
country where the damage has arisen), therefore leaving an uncertainty
surrounding the rules governing the dispute.132
Civil and criminal avenues both have their advantages and drawbacks and
neither is a per se panacea. However, one ancient and long time dormant 1789
American federal statute, the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"), pursuant to which
"[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States," 13 3 deserves the utmost attention since it has combined the large
scope of application of civil claims (favoring the inclusion of corporations and the
more generous torts compensation standards), the incrimination stemming from
international humanitarian law, an absence of time limitations on claims and an
"universal jurisdiction" approach to extraterritorial reach. 13 4 These elements,
coupled with the fact that the United States hosts a large number of major
international corporations with worldwide branches and subsidiaries - thereby
facilitating personal jurisdiction as well as the satisfaction of the claim - have
generated an explosive legal mixture attracting civil litigation implicating
corporate violations of JHL.
The recent growing application of this statute has given rise to countless
literature dealing with several of the aforementioned procedural aspects. 135 The
present discussion will be limited to the issues in connection with corporate
violations of IHL and is comprised of the following points: (1) whether the ATCA
covers violations of IHL (ratione materiae); (2) whether the ATCA applies to
corporations (ratione personae) and whether corporations can be held liable of
violations of IHL, notably as accomplices; (3) whether a parent company can be
held liable for the misconduct of one of its subsidiaries; and (4) whether the ATCA
permits an individual right of redress.
(1) Liability under ATCA depends on a violation of either "the law of
nations" or of "a treaty of the United States."1 36 The key issue, therefore, is
whether IHL can be considered as one of these two sources. In this regard, the
recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain does not
provide an unambiguous guide.137 In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that
132. Id. at 51-53; see also Eric Mongelard, Corporate Civil Liability for Violations ofInternational
Humanitarian Law, 88 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 665, 687 (2006).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1991).
134. Corporations may not be prosecuted in the U.S. for international crimes considering that the
relevant federal criminal statutes apply only to individuals. See Robert C. Thompson, Survey Questions
& Responses, Laws of the United States of America, FAFO, 12-14 (2006), available at
http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/CCCSurveyUS06Sep2006.pdf.
135. For the most comprehensive overview see THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN ANALYTICAL
ANTHOLOGY 259 (Ralph G. Steinhardt & Anthony D'Amato eds., 1999).
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1991).
137. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714-15 (2004).
222 VOL. 3 8:2
MAPPING A RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATIONS
beyond the three primary offenses that were foreseen in 1789 (violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy), the room is
"open to a narrow class of international norms today."13 8 It pointed out, however,
that "federal courts should not recognize claims under federal common law for
violations of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance
among civilized nations than the 18th-century paradigms familiar when § 1350 [the
ATCA] was enacted,"1 39 endorsing therefore the inclusion of several related-IHL
norms by lower federal courts which considered that genocide, 140 torture,141 war
crimes and violations of IHL (regardless of the international or non-international
dimension of the conflict) 142 fall within the scope of the ATCA.
(2) On the ratione personae prong, it has been admitted in Kadic v. Karadzic
that some violations of the law of nations may be committed by non-state actors,
including war crimes and violations of IHL. 143 The extension of the ATCA to
corporations was also expressly acknowledged in Doe I. v. Unocal1 44 but explained
in greater detail in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy where the
court considered that "corporations may also be held liable under international law,
at least for gross human rights violations."1 45  Despite the absence of an
international precedent explicitly attributing a violation of international law to a
private legal person, some federal courts cited the Nuremberg "Industrial cases"1 46
which demonstrate how certain corporations could be "[an] instrumentality of
cohesion in the name of which the enumerated acts . . . were committed."1 4 7
Relying on this authority which, as already discussed, did not recognize the actual
138. Id. at 715, 729.
139. Id. at 694 (emphasis added).
140. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995) ("In the aftermath of the atrocities
committed during the Second World War, the condemnation of genocide as contrary to international
law quickly achieved broad acceptance by the community of nations.").
141. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) ("In light of the universal
condemnation of torture in numerous international agreements, and the renunciation of torture as an
instrument of official policy by virtually all of the nations of the world ... we find that an act of torture
committed by a State official against one held in detention violates established norms of the
international law of human rights, and hence the law of nations").
142. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243 ("The District Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the Alien Tort Act over
appellants' claims of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law."); see also In re
Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F.Supp.2d 7, 113 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Although Kadic
predates Sosa, the former's reasons for recognizing civil liability for war crimes under the ATS remains
sound.").
143. Id. ("[U]nder the law of war as codified in the Geneva Conventions, all 'parties' to a conflict-
which includes insurgent military groups-are obliged to adhere to these most fundamental requirements
of the law of war ... The liability of private individuals for committing war crimes has been recognized
since World War I and was confirmed at Nuremberg after World War II").
144. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002).
145. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 319 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). The Court stated further that "[g]iven that private individuals are liable for violations of
international law in certain circumstances, there is no logical reason why corporations should not be
held liable, at least in cases ofjus cogens violations". Id.
146. Jacobson, supra note 39, at 170.
147. In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 57 (E.D. N.Y. 2005) (quoting United States v. Krauch
(the I.G. Farben case), 8 TRiALS WAR CRIM. 1081, 1152-53 (1952)).
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criminal liability of corporations, the District Court however considered that
"limitations on criminal liability of corporations do not necessarily apply to civil
liability of corporations,"148 thereby exploiting the civil aspect of the ATCA to
extend its reach to corporations. 149
(3) Considering the "complexity of modem business structures," 5 0 another
important element of ATCA litigation over corporations lies in the possibility to
reach the parent entity when the violation has been committed by one of its
subsidiaries. Contrary to the "aiding and abetting" standard where federal courts
have eventually relied on international criminal law, courts have implemented
domestic approaches when it comes to piercing the corporate veil.' Two
arguments may be put forward to support this approach: the incompleteness of
international law in this field, 15 2 and the necessity to respect federal due process
standards since the piercing will also permit to establish personal jurisdiction over
the defendant (usually the so-called "doing business" jurisdiction), which is a
distinct issue from the subject matter jurisdiction stemming from the ATCA.153
Federal courts are therefore more likely to apply alter-ego and agency theories in
order to decide whether a parent company can be held liable for the conduct of one
of its subsidiaries. 154
(4) The issue of compensation is of the same nature. Kadic v. Karadzic
underlined that "[t]he law of nations generally does not create private causes of
action to remedy its violations, but leaves to each nation the task of defining the
remedies that are available for international law violations,"15' recognizing
therefore the role of domestic law as a gap-filler and the use of a domestic standard
for the reparation of a violation of the law of nations. The remedy available under
148. Id. at 57.
149. Regarding the "aiding and abetting" standard, federal courts have shown inconsistency, using
both international criminal law as well as federal common law approaches of the concept. For a
comprehensive analysis, see Chimbne I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 61, 79 (2008). However, a recent decision of the Second Circuit indicates that liability
for aiding and abetting in ATCA cases for corporations requires that the defendant "(1) provides
practical assistance to the principal which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime, and
(2) does so with the purpose of facilitating the commission of that crime." Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l
Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 277 (2d Cir. 2007).
150. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 127, at 45 (pointing out that "[it is not uncommon for
one business enterprise to now consist of a parent company with many subsidiaries . . . . In this context,
there are a number of reasons why it may be important to consider the involvement of a parent company
in the conduct of its subsidiary, when allegations of complicity in gross human rights abuses arise.").
151. In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
152. Id. ("Piercing of the corporate veil reflects the protection provided to business organizations
by domestic law. Therefore, the question of alter ego liability does not raise the same universality
concerns as does the recognition of individual torts under Sosa . .. [and] the international law of agency
has not developed precise standards for this Court to apply in the civil context. Therefore, I will apply
federal common law principles concerning agency.").
153. Id. at 277.
154. See id. at 271 for a recent application in an ATCA case.
155. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l
Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 269 (2d Cir. 2007) ("The common law thus permits the 'independent judicial
recognition of actionable international norms'.").
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the ATCA is therefore subject to the generous monetary compensations awarded in
tort disputes1 56 and claimants have been awarded relief "often including millions of
dollars in punitive damages,"157 although the damages obtained against individuals
have rarely been recovered. 158
In a nutshell, as pointed out in a recent ATCA case, "[t]he task of a domestic
court is to provide a forum, procedures, and a remedy,"15 9 that are not available in
the international arena against corporations. While the conditions of its application
are stringent and it should not be seen as an easy source of redress for victims,160
the ATCA has proven to constitute one of the mechanisms, among others, of
enforcement of IHL norms. Its uniqueness lies in the way it has operated to
encompass both IHL norms and international criminal law within the domestic law
of torts, two spheres fundamentally unfamiliar to each other but having established
their compatibility when their respective role is adequately allocated.
IV. CONCLUSION
An analysis of the responsibility of corporations for violations of IHL has
highlighted the crucial role of States. Indeed, the limitation to the ratione personae
jurisdiction of the ICC as well as the necessity of a domestic implementation of the
UN Security Council resolutions have demonstrated that the accountability of
corporations in the international arena is still largely hypothetical and requires the
competences of national legal orders.
UN sanctions, although requiring a Security Council resolution, have
constituted an original and effective mechanism of indirect enforcement of IHL
norms with a broader scope of application potentially affecting innocent
bystanders, e.g. corporations that would have never been held liable for violations
of IHL under the ATCA even by implementing the looser "aiding and abetting"
standards.
From a judicial perspective, while domestic criminal liability of corporations
for IHL violations is in ferment and its potential has not been widely explored yet,
the civil liability framework of the ATCA has demonstrated its broad potential to
hold corporations accountable. Besides, one of the recent Ruggie reports has
implicitly advocated the development and the implementation of the ATCA model
abroad, recommending notably that "[s]tates should strengthen judicial capacity to
hear complaints and enforce remedies against all corporations operating or based
in their territory [and] should address obstacles to access to justice, including for
156. Thompson, supra note 134, at 13 ("The U.S. has a robust tort system, both at the state and
federal levels, and victims of torts connected with violations of international criminal law or
international humanitarian law may sue for damages and other relief, either individually or as part of a
class action suit.").
157. Id. at 16. Footnote 54 of the preceding source lists examples of damages awarded under
ATCA cases. Id.
158. ILARIA BOTTIGLIERO, REDRESS FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 63-4
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004).
159. In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
160. Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Myth From Reality About Corporate Responsibility
Litigation, 7 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 263, 269 (2004).
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foreign plaintiffs - especially where alleged abuses reach the level of widespread
and systematic human rights violations." 61
While we are witnessing an internationalization of criminal law as well as an
impressive international criminalization of violations of IHL by individuals, the
most promising future for the liability of corporations for the same violations -
although their involvement is usually not of same amplitude - possibly lies in an
expansion of domestic civil liability frameworks, overcoming the reluctance of
some States to recognize the criminal liability of corporations. At the same time, it
is possible that this development in the civil liability arena would constitute just
one step towards the emergence of a most comprehensive global framework for
corporate responsibility.
The international community, through the development of several soft law
instruments, has shown its will to better regulate the activities of multinational
corporations. The possible expansion and progressive customary crystallization of
domestic civil liability of corporations for JHL violations could pave the way to an
initiative for an internationalization of this process and - why not - lead to the
establishment of an international civil tribunal to this end. Just like States,
corporations have been excluded from the ratione personae jurisdiction of the
ICC1 62 and, as States, corporations are sometimes the social instrumentalities of
IHL abuses. However, international responsibility exists for the former, but it is
still at the stage of chrysalis for the latter. More comprehensive legal
accountability mechanisms for corporations would certainly be an effective tool for
implementing IHL, economic and reputational pressure and the fear of the
financial stick being the best carrots to drive corporations towards a more global
and effective compliance with IHL.
161. Protect, Respect, and Remedy, supra note 75, 91.
162. Eser, supra note 4141, at 779.
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